The pilot put his son at the controls. A310 crash - there was a child at the controls (1 photo). Final report of the investigation
If until now all the stories about plane accidents have been more or less positive, now I’ll tell you about a rare piece of assholery.
Black Box entry:
Commander: Well, Yana, will you pilot?
Yana (sitting in the ship’s commander’s chair): No!
...
The son of the Eldar ship commander appears. Sits in the commander's chair.
Eldar: Can this be rotated?
Commander: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left!
Commander: Turn! Turn left!
Eldar: Great!
Commander: Is the plane going to the left?
Eldar: Coming.
Several minutes pass.
Eldar: Why is he turning around?
Commander: Does it turn on its own?
Commander: Hold the helm!
Pilot: Speed!
Commander: Turn left! Left! Right! Left! The earth is here! Eldar, come out! Get out, Eldar! Come out! Come out! Come out!
...
fucked up, which claimed 75 lives due to strangers being in the cockpit
By the way, there was a second reason. It turns out that if you apply a force of 8-10 kg to the side of the steering wheel on an Airbus-310 aircraft, the autopilot is partially disabled. But! Initially, one of the pilots brought two of his children into the cockpit.
So. On March 22, 1994, an Airbus 310 aircraft (F-OGQS "M. Glinka") was flying from Moscow (Sheremetyevo) to Hong Kong. When the flight had already covered a decent part of the journey, PIC Andrei Danilov went to the cabin to take a nap.
Reserve PIC Yaroslav Kudrinsky and co-pilot Igor Piskarev remained in the cockpit.
The captain of the same aircraft, V. Makarov, who was on vacation, and two of Kudrinsky’s children, Yana (13 years old) and Eldar (15 years old), came to “visit” the cabin.
The father gave way to the children.
At first, my daughter sat at the helm for 7.5 minutes. She, despite her father's advice, refused to take the helm. But the son who replaced her followed his father’s order, “Turn! Turn left!”
The result - 63 passengers and 12 crew members died due to the negligence of the professional pilots in the cockpit.
"...It turned out that the airbus fell from a height of 10,100 m, along the steepest possible trajectory, which rarely or almost never happens during plane crashes. The crew did not even have time to transmit anything to the ground. The plane crashed on a mountainside, but for some reason it didn’t touched the tree tops.
22.05; 22.08. By order of the duty service of the Russian Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Service, an An-12 aircraft of the air defense forces took off from Novosibirsk; from Novokuznetsk - Mi-8 MGA helicopter.
23.30. Information was received from a local resident that burning aircraft debris was spotted in the area of the village of Mayzas (10 km southeast of the city of Mezhdurechensk).
00.06. On March 23, the helicopter commander reported that 8 km south of Mayzas, within a radius of 2 km, he saw burning wreckage of the aircraft.
03.00. From Plotnikov (40 km south of the city of Kemerovo) a mobile detachment (41 people, 12 pieces of equipment) began moving, paving the road.
03.30. An Mi-8 helicopter with ten rescuers on board flew to the crash site from Mezhdurechensk. Finally, the Il-76 of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations delivered fifteen rescuers with the necessary equipment and machinery.
Journalist Vasily Gorbunov made his way to the scene of the disaster along with rescuers. This is what he said
“The first sensation coming is the strong smell of kerosene. You take one look and it becomes an eerie pile of small garbage. It looks like the plane literally crashed to pieces. The smallest fragments are scattered along the hillside in a ribbon a hundred meters wide, stretching for about half a kilometer. The largest fragment of the starboard side that I saw was three by four meters. Bodies Almost everything that was left of the people was strongly pressed into the snow. You can see arms somewhere, legs somewhere, backs somewhere... In such places the hardest thought is why things are more durable than people. Cans of beer, bags, clothes, dollars are scattered everywhere... It’s impossible to take your eyes off the bright painted Easter egg someone was preparing for the holiday..."
...Many passengers remained seated, strapped to their seats. Among the dead, rescuers managed to find two children who were flying on this flight. One of the crew members decided to take them on vacation to show Hong Kong. At that time, no one knew that it was children who played a tragic role in this disaster. Almost nothing remained of the Airbus. More than a million dollars, a lot of jewelry, gold jewelry were found at the scene of the disaster..."
A small fragment from the order (conclusions):
"Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation
ORDER
04/28/95 No. 44
ABOUT THE ACCIDENT OF THE AIRCRAFT A310-308 F-OGQS OF THE RUSSIAN AIRLINE LINES (RAL)
...
The crash of the A310 aircraft occurred as a result of its stalling with a spin and collision with the ground due to a combination of the following factors:
1. Permits from PIC Ya.V. Kudrinsky to take his workplace and interfere with the control of the aircraft by an unauthorized person (his son), who does not have the right and appropriate qualifications.
2. Performing demonstration maneuvers not provided for by the flight plan and flight situation using the autopilot of the PIC who is not at his workplace.
3. The application of forces by an unauthorized person and the co-pilot to the control wheels, interfering with the normal operation of the roll autopilot (this is not recommended by the A310 aircraft Flight Manual), which led to overpowering and disconnection of the autopilot from the aileron control wiring,
4. Unnoticed by the co-pilot and the PIC, the autopilot was disconnected from the aileron control wiring, probably due to:
- the absence of an instrumental alarm system for disengagement on the A310 aircraft;
etc....
...
Minister of Transport V.B. Efimov
This is what air carelessness happens.
March 22, 1994 in the Mezhdurechensk area (Kemerovo region) at 20 o'clock. 58 min. An Airbus A-310, owned by Russian Airlines and flying on the Moscow-Hong Kong route, crashed and crashed. There were 63 passengers and 12 crew members on board the plane. The opening of the black boxes subsequently showed that the cause of the disaster was the human factor, poor knowledge of this type of equipment by the crew and a gross violation of instructions.
3.5 hours after takeoff, crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky called his two children into the cockpit - daughter Yana and son Eldar, where, in violation of the regulations, he allowed first his daughter and then his son to sit in the ship’s commander’s chair. This circumstance was ignored by other crew members. In addition, in the cockpit was a friend of the Kudrinsky family, Makarov, also a pilot, flying on the same flight as a passenger.
Before allowing the children to take the command seat, Kudrinsky turned on the autopilot. First, the commander’s daughter, 13-year-old Yana Kudrinskaya, was in the pilot’s seat. She did not attempt to take any action to control the aircraft. After her, the captain’s son, 15-year-old Eldar Kudrinsky, took the helm. The teenager held onto the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side. Everything was perceived as entertainment and adults had no control over the teenager. At one point, the guy shook the steering wheel harder and the autopilot, mistaking this for the pilot’s command, turned off. In one second, the plane became obedient to the teenager, who continued to play pilots.
The light alarm for disabling the autopilot mode went off, but the crew did not notice this, since a design feature of the A310 is the absence of an audible alarm for disabling the autopilot. Once again tilting the steering wheel to the side, the boy put the airbus into a deep roll, which soon reached 45 degrees and caused an overload of about 5g. In the first seconds, both professional pilots for several seconds could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft. And when the crew members noticed that the autopilot was disabled, they tried to take their seats again.
Contrary to the instructions, the co-pilot, in the absence of the commander in his seat, moved his seat all the way back, which for a long time did not allow him to take a working position due to the overloads that had arisen. And the aircraft commander, due to strong overloads and a large roll angle, could not get into his seat for a long time.
The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that in the left seat there was still the only person who had the physical ability to control the plane - the 15-year-old son of the commander, who received and tried to carry out various, inconsistent and contradictory commands from his father, the co-pilot and Makarov. According to an analysis of the “black box” audio track, Eldar’s attempts to correct the situation were greatly hampered by his lack of knowledge of pilot’s jargon. As an example, the command “Hold the helm!” was given, which the boy took as a command to hold the steering wheel in the extreme right position, while the pilots meant a command to level the plane.
Meanwhile, the roll had already reached 90°, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further descent, the autopilot (only the roll automatic was turned off) increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the plane began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the automatic control and managed to bring the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The overload decreased, and the commander finally managed to pull his son out of his chair and take his workplace. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but were unable to recognize their spatial position in time. Flying over the hill at low altitude, the plane caught on the edges of trees and crashed into the forest near the village of Maly Mayzas, about 20 kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk.
Crew negotiations, chronology of events
Symbols used in the text:
PIC - aircraft commander Ya. V. Kudrinsky
Yana is the commander’s daughter, born in 1981.
Eldar - son of the commander, born in 1978.
2P - co-pilot I.V. Piskarev
Makarov - pilot flying to Hong Kong as a passenger
E - one of the pilots in the cockpitAbout half an hour before the disaster. The plane flies on autopilot. In the cockpit there are the aircraft commander, the co-pilot and two strangers - the aircraft commander's daughter Yana and passenger Makarov.
17:43:30: PIC [addressing his daughter Yana]: Come sit here now, on my chair, do you want to?
17:43:31: PIC left his workplace
17:43:34-17:43:37: Yana sat down in the PIC chair
17:44:10: Yana: Dad, lift me up [Yana asked to lift her chair up]
2P: Novosibirsk, Aeroflot, 593rd we pass your point at flight level 10,100.
17:47:06: PIC: Well, Yana, will you pilot?
Yana: No!
PIC: Don't press the buttons. Don't touch this red one!
Yana: Dad, can this be played?
PIC: Do you see Novokuznetsk on the left?
Yana: Are we flying so low?
PIC: Ten thousand one hundred meters.
Yana: That's a lot, right?
KVS: A lot...
Yana tries to leave the chair.
PIC: Wait, don’t rush...
Yana: I’m already careful...
17:51:12: Yana left the PIC chair
The son of the aircraft commander, Eldar, appears.
17:51:47: Makarov: The counter is being removed.
17:51:55: Eldar sat down in the PIC chair.
17:52:46: Eldar [addressing Makarov]: Are you filming?
17:52:48: Makarov: I’m filming.
Eldar: Can this be turned?
17:54:25: PIC: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left!
PIC: Turn! Turn left!
17:54:35: PIC: So, watch the ground, where you will turn. Let's go left, turn left!
Eldar: Great!
17:54:37: PIC: Off I go, huh?
17:54:39: Eldar turned the helm to the left by 3..4 degrees.
17:54:40: PIC: Is the plane going to the left?
17:54:41: Eldar: Coming.
17:54:42: PIC: Not visible, right?
E:< неразб>
17:54:50: E: Now it will go to the right
17:54:53: Makarov: Set the attitude indicator for him properly.
17:05:05: The plane began to roll to the right.
17:55:12: PIC: What do you want, Yana?
Yana:< неразб>
17:55:15: PIC [addressing Yana]: Why?
Yana:< неразб>
17:55:18: PIC [addressing Yana]: In first class you will only sleep.
17:55:27: PIC [addressing Yana]: Don’t run around there, otherwise they’ll kick us out of work.
17:55:28: From this time on, unnoticed by either the PIC or the co-pilot, a gradual increase in the right roll began.
17:55:36: Eldar [about the plane’s course]: Why is it turning?
17:55:38: PIC: Does it turn itself?
17:55:40: Eldar: Yes.
17:55:41: E: Why does he turn?
17:55:42: Eldar: I don’t know.
17:55:45: PIC: You won’t throw off the course?
17:55:45: Makarov: He’s still moving the zone, guys. [Makarov assumed that the plane was leaving for the holding area]
17:55:46: 2P: We went to the area, waiting.
17:55:48: PIC: Yes?
17:55:49: 2P: Of course.
17:55:50: Makarov: Damn! [Thus Makarov reacted to the rapid increase in vertical overload in the plane]
17:55:52: PIC: Hold it! Hold the helm, hold it!
17:55:55: 2P: Speed!
17:55:56: 2P: In the opposite direction.
17:55:58: 2P: In the opposite direction.
17:55:59: 2P: Back!
17:55:59: PIC: Turn left! Left! Right! Left!
17:56:06: E: Right?
17:56:08: E: You don’t see, or what?
17:56:11: Autopilot disabled.
17:56:14: E: Turn right.
17:56:17: PIC: Right!
17:56:18: 2P: Yes, to the left! The earth is here!
17:56:24: FAC: Eldar, come out!
17:56:26: PIC: Crawl back.
17:56:28: PIC: Crawl back, Eldar.
17:56:30: E: You see< неразб>No?
17:56:34: 2P: Small ores!
17:56:38: PIC: Come out!
17:56:40: E: Come out, Eldar.
17:56:41: E: Come out< неразб>.
17:56:43: E: Come out.
17:56:44: E: Come out.
17:56:47: E:< неразб>.
17:56:49: E: Come out.
17:56:52: E: Come out, I say.
17:56:54: 2P: Full throttle! Full throttle! Full throttle!
17:56:55: By this moment, the PIC had taken his workplace.
17:56:56: 2P: Gave on the gas!
17:56:57: PIC: Full throttle!
17:56:58: 2P: Gave!
17:56:59: E:< неразб>.
17:57:00: E: Full throttle.
17:57:05: E: I gave it gas, I gave it.
17:57:08: E: What is the speed?
17:57:09: E:< неразб>.
17:57:13: E:< неразб>.
17:57:17: E: Yes.
17:57:23: PIC: Full gas!
17:57:25: 2P: The speed is very high!
17:57:27: E: Big, right?
17:57:28: E: Big.
17:57:29: E: I turned it on.
17:57:30: PIC: Okay, that’s it, let’s go out, let’s go out.
17:57:32: PIC: Right! Leg to the right!
17:57:35: PIC: High speed.
17:57:36: PIC: Turn off the gas!
17:57:37: 2P: Cleaned it up!
17:57:42: PIC: Quietly!
17:57:47: 2P: B..., again!
17:57:48: E: Don’t turn to the right.
17:57:50: E: Added speed.
17:57:53: PIC: Let's go out now! Everything is fine!
17:57:55: PIC: Slowly on yourself.
17:57:56: PIC: Slowly.
17:57:57: PIC: Slowly, I say!
17:58:01: The plane collides with the ground.
During the investigation, conducted jointly by Aeroflot and Airbus, changes were made to the aircraft documentation and the Aeroflot pilot training plan. And during simulator flights performed by Russian instructor pilot Vladimir Biryukov together with Airbus test pilots, it turned out that if both pilots were unable to reach the controls, the automatic control system would be able to take over control and quickly restore a straight-line safe flight.
The commission established the following:By the beginning of the playback of the magnetic recording of the conversations in the cockpit (17:26:52), there was a reserve PIC in the left pilot's seat, and a co-pilot in the right pilot's seat. The aircraft commander was resting in the passenger cabin.
From 17:40 onwards, the passenger PIC and the children of the reserve PIC were in the cockpit. At 17:43:31, the reserve PIC left his workplace without transferring control of the aircraft to the co-pilot, which was then alternately occupied first by his daughter and then by his son (in violation of the requirements of NPP GA-85 clauses 7.1.3; 7.1.4 ; 7.1.5).
In the time interval between 17:43:34 and 17:43:37, Yana sat in the left chair and at 17:44:10 asked her father to lift the chair up. At 17:47:06, the reserve PIC invited his daughter to “pilot” the plane (“Well, Yana, will you fly? Hold on to the helm, hold on”). In the period from 17:47:10 to 17:50:44, using the autopilot course setter to demonstrate control of the aircraft to the daughter, a maneuver was performed to the left from a course of 111° to 102°, then to the right to 115°, followed (after 2 minutes 40 sec . after the start of the maneuver) by the aircraft reaching the specified course of 102°. After the plane set out on this course, Yana vacated the PIC seat at 17:51:12, remaining in the pilot’s cabin.
For 7.5 minutes, when the reserve PIC's daughter occupied the PIC's pilot's seat, there were conversations between father and daughter, distracting the crew from monitoring the flight parameters.
From 17:50:04 to 17:50:46, the co-pilot made a report to the dispatchers of Novosibirsk-control and Novokuznetsk-control about the passage of Novokuznetsk and the planned time of passage of the Zakir checkpoint at 17:59.
At 17:51:55 the left PIC seat was taken by the son of the reserve PIC Eldar. The reserve PIC decided to demonstrate to him the principles of piloting an aircraft by performing a maneuver similar to that which had just been shown to his daughter. At 17:54:25, in response to his son’s request to “turn” the wheel, the reserve PIC gave permission and at 17:54:35 said: “So, watch the ground, where you will turn. Let's go left, turn left!"
The son of the reserve PIC, starting at 17:54:39, applied force to the left steering wheel, deflecting it to the left by 3...4° for 5 seconds. At the same time, the autopilot worked to counter the created roll by deflecting the right aileron. At 17:54:44, the reserve PIC switched on the “course setting” submode and turned the autopilot course setting handle to turn left by more than 15° from the initial course of 105°, which created a left bank of 21.5° and reduced the effort at the helm. At 17:54:52, with a left bank of 17...19°, the reserve PIC turned the adjuster handle to the right to return to the original course of 105°. The autopilot deflected the ailerons to reduce left bank.
Thus, unlike the previous maneuver, with the permission of the reserve PIC, his son applied force to the left control wheel, holding it in a position close to neutral
The co-pilot was holding the right steering wheel at this time, possibly protecting it from deviations by the son of the reserve PIC - from 17:54:58, the left or right or simultaneously both steering wheels were held in the position 3...5° to the right.
At 17:55:05 the plane went from a left bank to a right bank.
Holding the control wheels while the aircraft was performing turns with rolls varying in magnitude and direction led to resistance to the autopilot steering gear, the appearance of variable magnitude and direction forces on the held control wheels and was the cause of an unintentional unsignaled (instrumentally) disconnected autopilot from the aileron control wiring, which occurred at 17 :55:25 with an increase in the total forces on the steering wheels to 11...13 kg.
As studies have shown, the autopilot is disconnected from the aileron control while holding the steering wheel(s) occurs with forces less than those stated in the Flight Operations Manual (FManual) and other regulatory documentation (15...17 kg). By holding both control wheels, the forces between them can be distributed in such a way that the moment of disconnection may not be noticed by the pilot.
The Flight Manual lacks proper information, and the flight crew training program lacks methods and training to recognize when the autopilot is disconnected from the roll channel control and the peculiarities of piloting an aircraft with the autopilot disconnected from the roll channel.
Since during the overpowering process and after disconnecting the autopilot, the control wheels were held in a position corresponding to a slight deviation of the ailerons to the right bank, the aircraft continued to increase the roll. The increase in roll went unnoticed by the crew due to the distraction of unauthorized persons in the cockpit and the absence of light and sound signaling on the aircraft to indicate that the autopilot had been disconnected. Moreover, the alarm system available on the aircraft, even after disconnecting the autopilot, continued to provide the crew with information about its operation in the previously specified mode, although the autopilot stopped performing its function of stabilizing and controlling the roll channel.
When the bank reached 20°, at 17:55:36, the ailerons were additionally deflected by 1.5...2° to the right bank. It was not possible to determine to which of the steering wheels efforts were applied to additionally deflect the ailerons. Due to the additional deflection of the steering wheel, the aircraft's right roll began to increase more intensely, and by 17:55:49 it exceeded its operational limit of 45° and continued to go unnoticed by the crew. After reaching this roll, the autopilot could not fully perform its altitude stabilization functions. The plane went into descent.
From 17:55:12 to 17:55:36, the reserve PIC was distracted from monitoring his son’s actions and flight parameters by talking with his daughter.
At 17:55:36 Eldar, still in the left pilot’s seat, was the first to notice “something incomprehensible” and drew the attention of his father, who was busy talking with Yana: “Why is he turning around?” The reserve PIC replied: “Does it turn itself?” Eldar confirmed “Yes.” From that time on, the pilots in the cockpit began searching for an explanation for why the plane was “turning.” At 17:55:45, the PIC passenger suggested that the aircraft was leaving for the holding area and was supported by the co-pilot.
The autopilot, which continues to perform its functions in the pitch channel to maintain the flight altitude during the development of the roll even after the steering gear is disconnected, brought the aircraft to the aerodynamic shaking mode and high angles of attack.
The crew discovered a dangerous situation only by the increase in overload and the appearance of aircraft shaking (buffeting) from 17:55:52. By this time, the roll had reached more than 50°, the angle of attack was 4...4.5°, and the vertical overload was 1.6 units. Simultaneously with the appearance of buffeting, in 2 seconds the angle of attack changed from 4.5° to 10° with virtually unchanged deflections of the elevator and stabilizer, which indicates the manifestation of “pickup” in the angle of attack.
The reserve PIC gave the command “Hold! Hold the helm! Hold it!” and after 2 sec. after the appearance of buffeting at a bank of 63°, the co-pilot took vigorous measures to bring the aircraft out of the right bank by completely deflecting the control wheel to the left. At the same time, who understood the command addressed to him and literally the son of the reserve PIC, clamped the left steering wheel in a position close to neutral for 3...4 seconds, as a result of which the left aileron and three of the five spoilers on the left wing were not deflected. This, combined with an increase in the angle of attack, reduced the effectiveness of the aircraft's lateral control (although it did not have a decisive effect), which did not allow reducing the right roll, which reached 90° 19 seconds after turning the helm to the left.
The crew's actions to counter the roll were generally inadequate to the situation. Appropriate actions to bring the aircraft to operational angles of attack and restore lateral control would be to disable the autopilot, push back the control wheel to reduce the angle of attack, then bring the aircraft out of the roll and descent.
In the process of countering the roll, the autopilot, upon a signal to reduce the set flight altitude, deflected the elevator to a pitching position, which accelerated the aircraft's approach to high angles of attack and stall. At the same time, executing the commands of the reserve PIC and PIC-passenger “In the opposite direction, turn to the left!”, which they gave over the next 21 seconds, the son of the reserve PIC rejected the steering wheel, thereby preventing the co-pilot, who, with his short stature (160 cm), from piloting. and with the seat moved almost to the rearmost position, he already had limited capabilities for piloting the aircraft.
Between 17:55:58 and 17:56:11 the Altitude Departure (twice), Stall Warning and Autopilot Disable alarms were triggered.
At the same time, the aircraft, with a right bank of 80...90°, increased the pitch angle for a dive from -15° to -50° with an acceleration in speed with a vertical load factor of about 2 units.
The crew's intervention in the pitch control by deflecting the steering column led at 17:56:11 to disabling the autopilot and issuing a corresponding alarm.
After the autopilot was turned off, the automatic protection system against reaching high angles of attack was activated, which deflected the stabilizer into a dive from -1° to -0.5°. At the same time, the elevator was also deflected into a dive from -7.5° to +2.5°. These actions led to a decrease in the angle of attack to +7°, an increase in the average vertical speed of descent to 200 m/s, an increase in vertical overload and speeds above the maximum permissible values. At the same time, from 17:56:04 to 17:56:18, the crew lost spatial orientation due to the roll. Having restored his orientation, the co-pilot pulled the plane out of the roll by deflecting the steering wheel to the left. The plane remained in a dive with a pitch angle of up to 40°. The speed reached 740 km/h by 17:56:29. The co-pilot, taking the helm, deflected the elevator to pitch up to the mechanical stop, which created an overload of 4.6...4.7 units above the established strength limits.
The reserve PIC continued to try to occupy his workplace, giving cues to his son “Get out, get out!”, but Eldar, due to significant vertical overloads and the narrow space between the seat and the left side, could not get out of the seat.
Almost simultaneously with the elevator deflection to pitch up, the crew reduced the engine operating mode. The action of these two factors led to an intense drop in the indicated speed to 185...220 km/h by 17:56:41. At this moment, someone (either Eldar, getting up from his seat, or the reserve PIC, occupying it) sharply deflected the rudder to an angle of about 8° by involuntarily releasing the pedal. The plane went into a sharp right roll with the ailerons deflected to the left, performing a spin roll. After stalling and performing a spin roll at angles of attack of 30...35°, the aircraft went into a left rotation with an increase in the dive angle to 80...90° and a decrease in vertical overload to zero, i.e. to weightlessness.
At 17:56:54, the co-pilot, noticing the decrease in speed to less than 180 km/h, gave the command “Full throttle!” three times. At that moment the plane was almost in a vertical dive and in the initial acceleration phase. The position of the reserve PIC in the seat, who had taken his place by 17:56:40...17:56:46, with his height of 170 cm and the seat shifted to almost the rearmost position, did not provide normal control of the aircraft.
By 17:57:11 the speed had reached 370 km/h, the plane slowed down its roll rotation (the roll leveled off within 20...22°, the pitch angle decreased to -20°. With the elevator remaining deflected completely "towards itself", the plane went over The reserve PIC, by alternately deflecting the pedal against the rotation, tried to stop it, which he managed to do at 17:57:56 at an altitude of about 300...400 m. However, the elevator deflected to the nose could not ensure that the aircraft entered controlled flight. After stalling, having made two turns in a corkscrew to the left, with an average vertical speed of 75 m/s at 17:58:01 (0:58 on March 23 local time), the plane collided with the surface of the earth, completely collapsed and partially burned. passengers died.
25 years ago– On March 23, 1994, an Airbus A310 airliner crashed in the Kemerovo region, flying from Moscow to Hong Kong and bearing the name of the Russian composer Mikhail Glinka. All 75 people on board died in the disaster: 63 passengers and 12 crew members. The reason for the plane's crash was, in particular, that one of the pilots let his 15-year-old son take the controls.
The Airbus A310 airliner of Aeroflot's subsidiary RAL, created specifically for the operation of Airbuses, took off from Moscow at 20:39 on March 22. Four hours later, as the plane flew over Novokuznetsk, replacement crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky called his two children into the cockpit - 13-year-old Yana and 15-year-old Eldar - and invited them to take the helm. As follows from the decoding of the black boxes, Yana did not try to control the plane. After her, her brother took the helm.
Eldar: Can this be turned?
Kudrinsky: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: To the left.
Kudrinsky: Turn! Turn left! So, watch the ground, where you will turn. Let's go left, turn left!
Eldar: Great.
The A310 airliner, developed and put into production in the early 1980s by the European concern Airbus, was purchased by Russia in 1992. At that moment, the country began to feel the need for wide-body passenger aircraft - the narrow-body Il-62 was considered obsolete. The domestic wide-body Il-96 has only just been developed. The choice was between the American Boeing 767 and the European Airbus A310. It is possible that the decision was made, among other things, by political considerations - the Cold War with the United States had barely ended by that time.
The purchased Airbuses made only foreign flights, and only high-quality pilots who had at least 1000 hours of flight time, were fluent in English and were tested and trained by the manufacturer, Airbus Industry, were allowed to fly them. There were only 16 of them, including the replacement commander of the Hong Kong flight, Yaroslav Kudrinsky - he took this position in November 1992.
On that fateful day, while flying the plane with his father’s permission, Eldar accidentally turned off the autopilot, but no one paid attention to the light warning about this, and the equipment did not sound a sound signal: as it turned out later, the team was not aware of this feature of the control system. The International Aviation Committee, summing up the investigation into the crash, pointed to the lack of an instrumental alarm system on the A310 aircraft to indicate that the autopilot was turned off as one of the possible reasons for its death.
The plane was slowly banking, but no one noticed this until the overloads became noticeable and the airliner began to lose altitude. The passengers, feeling the strong tilt, screamed. The team also realized that the situation was out of control, the roll reached 45 degrees, which exceeded the maximum permissible values for the A310. Due to large overloads, Yaroslav Kudrinsky was unable to take his place at the helm - he was literally pressed against the side panel. For the same reason, the aircraft commander, Andrei Danilov, who has almost 10 thousand flight hours, more than 950 of them on the Airbus A310, was unable to enter the cockpit from the cabin, where he was sleeping before the plane began to roll. He had been flying for the previous 3 hours, and the next morning he had a return flight. Co-pilot Igor Piskarev, who had 5885 flight hours and sat at the controls of the Airbus six months before the disaster, tried to take control, but nothing worked for him: even before the autopilot turned off, he pushed his seat all the way back, and there was no overload. They allowed him to return to his working position.
The pilots tried to explain to Eldar what to do, but he did not understand the meaning of professional terms and acted rather at random, which is why the plane continued to fall. The panic lasted a little over a minute. Nevertheless, after several attempts, Piskarev managed to direct the plane upward, and the overload decreased. Kudrinsky took the pilot's seat and brought the plane out of the spin. However, this did not save them from death.
From the transcript of the flight recorders.
Kudrinsky: The gas is full!
2 pilot: The speed is very high!
Kudrinsky: Okay, that’s it, let’s go out, let’s go out. Right! High speed. Remove the gas!
2 pilot: Cleaned it up!
Kudrinsky: Quietly!
Kudrinsky: Let's go out now! Everything is fine! Slowly on yourself. Slowly. Slowly, I say!
These words became the last. In the confusion, the pilots lost track of exactly where their ship was at the moment. And at 0:58, a minute after the teenager gave up his place at the helm to his father, the plane’s tail touched a hill twenty kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk. A fire started. The plane crash killed 75 people, in addition to 52 Russian citizens, on board were six Chinese, six Hong Kong citizens, five Taiwanese, four British, an Indian, and a US citizen.
Things, jewelry, dollars were scattered along the slope, everything looked like a landfill. There was a strong smell of kerosene
It later turned out that the autopilot was not completely disabled, but partially, which also confused the pilots: because of this, they made the wrong decisions. When simulating the current situation on the Airbus Industry simulator in France, experts came to the conclusion that Igor Piskarev brought the plane out of the dive very steeply, directing it almost vertically - apparently, at that moment weightlessness had formed inside the plane. The built-in self-preservation mechanism would not allow the Airbus to fall down even at low speed, and if the pilots did not reach the steering wheel, the autopilot would restore safe flight. In any case, these are the results shown by Airbus Industry simulators. But, apparently, the team simply did not know about all these technical nuances of operating an imported airliner.
The A-310 crash became known only two hours later, after the plane stopped responding to requests from ground services. Rescuers, police officers, Investigative Committee officers, and journalists arrived at the scene.
“They called me from the press service of the Mezhdurechensk administration and said that a plane had crashed. I was surprised, I also joked, they say, tell me it’s a bomber. Then the rescue service called back and confirmed this information. When we arrived at the place, the police immediately cordoned off everything and journalists were not allowed anywhere. We just watched from the edge how the rescuers worked. Later, soldiers were brought there from Krasnoyarsk, and investigations began. What did I see there? Things, jewelry, dollars were scattered along the slope, everything looked like a landfill. There was a strong smell of kerosene. There were no big flames, only small fires in some places. It was difficult to determine where the remains of bodies or anything else were, everything was mixed up: snow and things, and debris. At the bottom of the valley, where the stream is, lay a large piece of the wing with the landing gear. This is approximately five square meters. Across the slope, on the other side, there is a fragment of the fuselage with portholes about 50 meters wide. The trees there were well blown down. It turned out that the plane’s tail touched the top of the hill and rolled down the slope, crumbling. If at the top he knocked down the trees at the root, then at the bottom they stuck out about a meter from the ground. It was customary among aviators to let friends steer and take pictures while the plane was on autopilot. The following things were shown on TV and in the press: that a famous hockey player or football player was sitting in the cockpit. That is, it was not special news that the child was sitting at the helm.
Soldiers also took part in eliminating the consequences of the disaster. Here's how describes it Maxim Karpovich: “I participated in the transportation of cargo 200 when I served in Military Unit 6609. They carried the remains to the Novokuznetsk morgue with their bare hands. They put them in coffins, then in tsinki. They took them to the airport and loaded them on flights to Moscow.”
Although the main parts of the plane were taken away for examination, small parts, seats, and tables for flight attendants remained scattered two kilometers away. Even this was enough to be horrified
Work at the site lasted several months, but the bodies of 22 passengers could not be identified. Soon the criminal case was dropped due to the death of the accused. According to the investigation report, experts counted eight causes of the accident, among which the first was the presence of a child at the helm.
“We wanted to go to the scene of the tragedy right away on the same day, but everything there was cordoned off. We have a colony-settlement next to the village, and the first officers of the GUFSIN were sent to the place to guard everything. They said there were dollars and jewelry scattered around the place. Whether this was so, the colony staff did not even tell us, the neighbors. It feels like they were forbidden to talk about what they saw. But the men walked around gloomy for a long time, as if someone had died there. We got there only a week later. Even after so many days, the smell of kerosene lingered. The trajectory of the fall was clear from the tops of the trees: the tree branches looked like they had been cut down. And although the main parts of the plane were taken away for examination, small parts, chairs, and tables for flight attendants remained scattered two kilometers away. Even this was enough to be horrified, a local resident recalls those events Olga.
According to the lawyer of the relatives of the victims Diana Sork, in all cases, settlement agreements were eventually concluded, all clients received insurance and compensation for moral damage.
– Each victim received compensation, although compensation for moral damage was small. In principle, in those years it was impossible to get more in court,” says Diana. – The heirs received the payments, and if there were several of them, the amount for each was small. There were those who were dissatisfied with the amount of payments, but since settlement agreements were concluded with the victims, those who signed them could not do anything. While working on this case, we did not encounter any opposition, except that the case was considered for a long time. This was a period in the 1990s when the courts were overwhelmed and were trying to delay everything they could. There was nothing hidden in the investigation. It was clear from the very beginning: the pilots noticed late that the plane had left automatic control and the voice sensor did not work. There were different people among the victims. There were girls about 20 years old who had never worked a day in their lives; everything was done for them by their husbands who were on that flight. There was a woman with two children, she had not worked for many years, she was raising children and was left, in principle, without a livelihood, and the only money she had was a social pension.
And yet who is to blame for the tragedy? The pilot team that allowed a child to take the controls, or the aircraft manufacturer that caused the autopilot to turn off without the crew noticing? , Honored Pilot of Russia, aviation expert, believes that it is impossible to answer this question unambiguously.
After this disaster, it became prohibited in Russia to keep doors open, and after September 11, 2001, armored doors began to be installed
– There is no single cause of tragedy, there is a whole chain of events following one after another. But, by and large, the fault was with the corporation, the manufacturer of the A310 airliner - Airbus Industry. During the flight, it turned out that the autopilot wanted to turn the plane according to the heading, but the boy held the steering wheel through physical force. In fact, the child fought against him, and, as a result, the steering wheel puck entered the neutral position, and he became separated into right and left. And this disconnection was not signaled; Airbus simply did not provide for it. Moreover, this was not mentioned anywhere, not in the technical documentation, and we, the pilots, were not trained in this.
– Having a stranger in the cockpit – how normal was that for those years?
- Of course, on the ground, letting someone sit at the helm is normal. But in the air, when you have 200 passengers behind you, this is irresponsibility, you couldn’t do this. At that time, we studied in Canada, Austria, Germany, where all the pilots calmly flew with the door open. They set an example for us in this. Passengers could enter the cabin, or walk past and see that the crew was not sleeping, but working. However, after this disaster in Russia it became prohibited to keep doors open, and after September 11, 2001, armored doors began to be installed.
– Judging by the decoding of the flight recorders, the pilots managed to level the course of the plane, and if not for the hill on the way, the tragedy might not have happened?
- Exactly. I watched the transcripts, the negotiations in the cockpit. By the way, the crew dealt with the situation quite calmly. They leveled the plane, but, unfortunately, the hill turned out to be higher than their flight level.
–Are there any cases of looting known at the site of the tragedy?
– Such cases occur everywhere; human greed is not regulated by legal norms. I know people who were there during the investigation, but I don’t know anything about the looting, and these cases have not been officially recorded in any way.
– During the investigation, how did the representatives behave?Airbus Industry?
“They participated in the investigation absolutely objectively. Moreover, after the tragedy, they taught all pilots who operate this type of aircraft that unsignaled shutdowns can occur, and taught how to behave in such situations; certain preventive work was carried out. We have been in contact with Airbus for many years, they have operated this aircraft for almost 20 years, we have flown with their instructors, and there has been no reason to change their attitude towards this manufacturer, or for them to change their attitude towards us.
The crew of the deceased airliner was buried at the Mitinskoye cemetery in Moscow.
“Yes, just like yesterday. The crew was buried at Mitinsky, yesterday there were 30 people, every year there are fewer and fewer. Shortly before the disaster, I accidentally met a flight attendant, Artyom Sh., he really wanted to leave Aeroflot for RAL (daughter, with his general, crew etc., practically independent) switch. The most prestigious flights and planes at that time, the payment is appropriate. Damn switched," a flight attendant with the nickname Ars wrote online on the day of the anniversary of the plane crash.
Six months after the disaster, Aeroflot CEO Vladimir Tikhonov said that the scandal surrounding the crash of the Airbus led to the loss of approximately 30% of potential passengers. The following year, Aeroflot's subsidiary RAL, which operated Airbuses, was liquidated. The Moscow – Hong Kong flight number was changed from SU593 to SU212, and Airbuses were removed from it, replacing it with a Boeing 777-300ER. The name of the composer Glinka was no longer assigned to any of Aeroflot's aircraft.
In 1994, many media reported that on March 22 at 20.58.01 Moscow time, the passenger airbus A-310-300 “Glinka” crashed in the Mezhdurechensk area.
It belonged to Russian Airlines and operated a flight on the Moscow-Hong Kong route. “All 75 people on board were killed.”
These messages were unusual in indicating the exact time of the disaster, the flight number, the name of the airline and the airliner itself. Otherwise, it was not much different from others that reported similar aircraft accidents in various parts of our planet.
But gradually many newspapers began to focus attention on this disaster. Moskovsky Komsomolets responded to the results of the first studies with the article “Witnesses who do not disappear.” In it, in particular, it was noted that there is always a reason and even a number of reasons why disasters happen.
“The last witnesses in this case are the “black boxes”, which keep a tape recording of everything that happens in the cockpit until the very last minute: negotiations with the Earth, commands, cries for help.
The Glinka airbus, flying to Hong Kong with 63 passengers on board, suddenly disappeared from the screens and, without giving any signals, fell from a height of 10,100 meters. Rescue teams sent to the crash site discovered the wreckage of the airliner within a few hours. Parts of the tail, wings, and cabin of the aircraft were lying separately from each other. All that was left of him was piles of ashes.
Airbus A-310-300
Of the three “black boxes,” only two survived. They were burned and deformed, but the records in them were preserved. They were deciphered in France in the presence of members of the Russian State Commission. The first versions seemed simply fantastic: the plane either collided with a natural celestial body drawn into the earth's gravity zone, or became a victim... of a UFO.
These assumptions were based on the fact that the airliner was flying at an altitude of 10 kilometers, clearly maintained all the specified flight parameters and did not give an “SOS” signal. Later, there was a rumor about an alleged terrorist act and depressurization of the hull, which caused the instant death of the crew and passengers.
News agencies put forward their own assumption: the pilots allowed children to sit at the controls of the plane. One of them pressed the wrong button and the plane began to fall.
However, all competent persons unanimously declare that this cannot be true and nothing like that - in principle! - cannot happen. Russian scientist A.F. Chernyaev, analyzing the situation with the airliner, claims that there is simply no such button that can display the entire aircraft control system. Children's voices that are heard in the “black box” do not in themselves mean anything.
Perhaps the children were not even in the cockpit, but simply stood in the aisle, watching the crew at work. According to international rules, this is not prohibited at all. On the contrary, an aircraft of this class must always have its doors open during the flight so that passengers feel calmer and more confident.
Further events developed as follows. The aircraft commander is perplexed when the autopilot suddenly makes an unplanned maneuver. After this, the airliner suddenly falls on its side and begins to lose altitude. The crew is trying to correct the situation, but nothing is working - something is not working.
Only near the ground do the pilots manage to level the plane, but then there is an explosion. The last words before the explosion were: “We did it...”
Maybe the plane hit one of the hills, lost its wing and began to fall apart in pieces? The place where the wreckage of the airliner was found speaks of just such a fall.
At the test stand in Toulouse, Russian and French specialists reproduced the flight of the A-310 many times. But even in the calm atmosphere of the earthly “flight,” the technology refused to reproduce those unimaginable pirouettes that the dying airliner made in the air.
After an unexpected descent from a height of 10,000 meters, the A-310 rushed towards the Earth, either in a tailspin or in a deep spiral. There was even a recorded rollover, which is completely out of the question for transport aircraft. Thus, even upon returning from France, the group of Russian experts was unable to name the cause of the disaster. Only by the end of October did experts from the two countries seem to have established it.
However, Russian citizens were not then able to familiarize themselves with these dramatic conclusions. According to international rules, a country investigating a crash on its territory must first familiarize the manufacturer and owner of the aircraft with all the findings. It is hardly possible to get acquainted with these details even now, because the documents seem to establish that the life and fate of the 75 people on board the plane were really decided by the “children’s” factor.
Crew commander Kudrinsky took his children, twelve-year-old Yana and fourteen-year-old Eldar, to spend spring break in Hong Kong. The roll of the aircraft arose from the simultaneous influence of the Eldar control wheel and the autopilot.
Eldar sits down in the left chair, and his eyes light up. Still would! Who among his peers does not dream of sitting at the controls of an airplane, and even during the flight!
The plane lifted its nose more and more, increasing the angle of attack of the wing (that is, as if it was specially striving for a position ideal for falling into a tailspin). At some point, this is exactly what happened with a machine that was absolutely not designed to fly in this mode. It turned out to be just as unusual for the crew.
This disaster became one of the most tragic and mysterious in Russian aviation. The Airbus was so technically advanced that its crew consisted of only two people - the first and second pilot. All other control was distributed between electronic devices.
The last communication session of Glinka took place with the city of Novokuznetsk at 20.49.47. The next one was supposed to be in ten minutes, but by this time not a single person was alive on the plane. In a few minutes, the liner will spin out of control and begin its “deadly dance.”
For now, everything seems calm on board. It was calm on the ground too.
A.F. Chernyaev, who has been studying the properties and effects of ether for many years, has repeatedly written in his works that there is a physical ether. The lives of people taking to the air largely depend on his behavior. The scientist was closely studying this whole situation with the Russian Airbus and believes that by this time, apparently, the plane was already flying in a dense ether-air cloud.
Its signal on the radar screens had either already begun to pulsate or disappeared altogether. And if this was really the case, then the disappearance of the signal should have served as a sign to the ground controller that the plane was in danger. And then he would still have a few minutes left to warn the airbus crew about her.
By this time (20.51.15) the pilots were already (apparently under the influence of the ether) inhibited and did not adequately perceive the situation. Devices under the influence of ethereal electrons also began to supply distorted information to the computer. From that moment, when Eldar began active piloting, the plane was doomed. The son practiced with all his might with the helm, and soon the huge airliner gradually began to obey the child - in defiance of the working autopilot.
The car began to lose the altitude and speed assigned to it by the autopilot. Soon Eldar was surprised to see that the earth “floated under the side.” The autopilot tried to adjust the changed parameters, according to the program embedded in it. The automation began to “take over” the steering wheel, Eldar turned it in his direction. For some time, piloting was carried out in two hands - the autopilot and the child, and each tried to “convince” the other that he was right. However, as noted by A.F. Chernyaev, everything could have happened exactly the opposite: both the machine gun and the man worked harmoniously.
However, a moment came when the young man realized that the plane was turning on its own. To understand this, he had to not operate the steering wheel for at least a few seconds. These seconds would be enough for the autopilot to level the flight. If the plane's instruments had not lied, if the airliner had been in a normal environment and had had enough engine power...
Soon the plane began to shake violently. Along with the shaking, a deafening roar burst into the cabin, because powerful overloads arose on board. The car tilts to the left more and more, the shaking intensifies, but the autopilot is still working. Apparently, they are trying to remove Eldar from the seat, but due to the increasing acceleration and triple G-forces, he is simply pressed into the seat.
They try to remove the guy, distraught with fear, from the seat (his father and one of the passengers), but then his foot accidentally rests on the right gas pedal. And the plane, flying at an extremely low (“stall”) speed and lifting its nose up to the limit, immediately falls to the right over its back. Pilots call this a "spin roll." It was at this moment that the autopilot shutdown signal went off and the Glinka began its irreversible movement towards the ground. Before this, the autopilot had been fighting with the man for fifteen whole seconds, performing dizzying manipulations with the plane. And only when the car reached a critical roll did it (as indicated in its operating instructions) turn off.
True, at this time Eldar had already been removed from the seat, and passenger Vladimir Makarov jumped into his place. The pilots seemed to feel familiar and began to take control of the situation. The crew tried to bring the car out of a deep spiral by increasing speed.
Prior to this, the state of “ethereal” intoxication did not allow pilots to simultaneously monitor several parameters, comprehend the situation and only then make decisions. The crew's attention was focused only on individual operations. This is probably why in two and a half minutes no one remembered about radio communications and their responsibilities to inform the ground controller about all the problems on board.
At 20.58 the plane began to lift its nose and level off, emerging from the spin. At this moment, there was visible hope for a successful outcome. But it was already too late! The earth was at a distance of three hundred meters, and there were four seconds left before the collision with it...
Probably (and even necessarily), there are other points of view and other explanations for the cause of the crash of the Glinka airliner. Experts from the two countries could not establish its exact cause. But A.F. Chernyaev believes that it is impossible to change the physics of the ether and it was she who invisibly played a fatal role in this tragedy.
Loading...